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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LOTTIE B. BEST, 
Plaint,iff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
1\IARILYXX HUBER, 
FRED HUBER, and 
FRED HUBER COMPANY, 
DefendaJits and Appellants. 
Case No. 
8235 
Brief of Appellants 
This appeal has to do with only one question. Did 
the plaintiff establish negligence on the part of defend-
ant? The facts are uncontradicted and \\'ere presented 
by plaintiff as part of plaintiff's case. The defendants 
presented no evidence because defendant \nu; called in 
plaintiff's case and related the facts as to the mechanical 
failure in defendants' car without prior warning, which 
caused the accident. These are the facts as established 
by plaintiff: 
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~larilyn Huber, with consent of her father, drove 
the fan1ily car to school on January 16, 1953. She was 
on that date within 26 days of her 18th birthday (R. 66). 
The car was a 1949 Kaiser sedan. She resided at 2471 
Douglas Street, Salt Lake City, and in driving the car 
to school had driven it in heavy traffic along 13th East 
Street, almost bumper to bumper, using the brakes, 
which were working all right (R. 80). She parked her 
car on 8th South (R. 67) while she was in school, and 
then when she left school she drove west on 8th South 
to 11th East, coming almost to a complete stop at that 
intersection, made a right turn on 11th East and drove 
north. In proceeding down 8th South she used the brake 
and it went nicely, depressing about one-fourth of the 
way down and she had full braking power (R. 68, 69). 
Prior to the accident the brakes were full, always held, 
and she had no trouble with them (R. 69). About a 
block away from the intersection of 11th East and 5th 
South she saw vehicles stopped at the 5th South inter-
section. She was traveling at about twenty or twenty-
five miles per hour (R. 71) and while approaching the 
intersection released the pressure on the gas and the 
compression slowed the car to a bout fifteen miles per 
hour (R. 72, 7:3). About 2¥2 to 3 car lengths away from 
the plaintiff's car (about the length of Judge Baker's 
court room) (R. 73} she applied her brakes and the 
brake pedal went to the floor boards (R. 73, 74). She 
pumped the brakes two or three times and they didn't 
hold at all and she hit plaintiff's car in the rear (R. 74), 
2 
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which was stopped at the intersection. The car was 
equipped with a hand brake in good condition, but she 
didn't have time to use it after she discovered that the 
foot brake had failed (R. 75 ), nor did she have time to 
turn to a Yoid the collision after such discovery ( R. 75). 
"Q. Do yon think you would haYe had time to 
turn out if you had turned after the first pump 
of the brake"? 
A. No, I d. on 't believe so. '' 
The Sunday before the accident she had driven the 
car to Brighton to ski and the brakes were functioning 
all right (R. 78). On the date of the accident she had 
no occasion to use the brakes between 8th South and 5th 
South until just a few car lengths before the accident 
(R. 79) and when the brake pedal went to the floor and 
she had no brakes she was shocked and surprised. The 
hill on 8th South is steep and the brakes were entirely 
sufficient to bring her to almost a complete stop and 
enable her to make a right-hand turn. (R. 78, 79). After 
the accident, it was discovered that the master cylinder 
was the cause of the trouble (R. 77). 
This was the evidence produced by plaintiff as to 
the cause of the accident and the conduct of defendant 
with reference thereto. 
POH\rrs 
1. THE rrRIAL COUHT EHRJ1JD IN DENYING 
~rorriON OF DEFENDANTS FOR DISlVliSSAL Arr 
THE CONCLUSION OF PLAINTIFF'S CASE. 
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2. rrHE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING 
TO DIRECT A VERDICT FOR DEFENDANTS. 
3. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING 
:MOTION OF DEFENDANTS TO SET ASIDE VER-
DICT AND ENTER JUDGMENT FOR SAID DE-
FENDANTS. 
Upon the foregoing evidence presented by plaintiff 
as to the cause of the accident, defendants rested their 
case without the presentation of any evidence, moved 
the court for a directed verdict, which was denied (R. 
125, 126) and moved the court for a judgment notwith-
standing the verdict (R. 139), which was likewise de-
nied (R. 140). 
ARGU~IENT 
Concisely stated, the point raised by all three of 
the above propositions is : 
WHERE AN ACCIDENT OCCURS BY REASON 
OF SUDDEN MECHANICAL FAILURE, WITHOUT 
REASON TO ANTICIPATE SUCH EVENT, AND 
WITH JUSTIFIABLE REASON TO BELIEVE THE 
:MECHANISM TO BE PROPER .AND IN GOOD CON-
DITION, XO NEGLIGENCE IS SHOWN AS A 
MATTER OF LAW. IT IS AN ACCIDENT FOR 
THE OCCURRENCE OF \VHICH XO LIABILITY 
ATTACHES. 
The trial court recognized the correctness of the 
above statement of law by giving the following instruc-
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tions to the jury, from which plaintiff does not cross-
appeal, and it is the law of this case. 
"INSTRUCTION NO. 8 
"You are instructed that the fact that a col-
lision occurred and injury and damages resulted 
does not of itself show that it was produced by 
negligence. Such a result may be the result solely 
of accident. If this collision occurred without it 
being produced, in whole or in part, by the negli-
gence of :Marilynn Huber, then it was an unavoid-
able accident. 
''An owner or operator of a motor vehicle is 
not an insurer against injuries or damage being 
caused by its operation but is liable only for 
negligence, and hence, an injury caused by the 
vehicle, without any negligence or ·wrong on the 
part of or attributable to the owner or operator, 
is considered as an unavoidable accident, for the 
consequences of which neither the owner nor the 
operator can be held responsible. Thus, you are 
further instructed that where the brakes of an 
automobile have previously functioned properly 
but suddenly, and without warning·, failed to 
respond, their failure does not render the owner 
or operator guilt~, of negligence unless they had 
previous knowledge of the defective condition." 
''IXSTRUCTION NO. 9 
"You are instructed that where the operator 
of a motor vehicle is h~T a sm1den c·mergenc~, 
placed in a position of imminent peril to herself 
or to another, without sufficient time in which to 
determine with certaint~' the best course to pur-
sue, she is not held to the same accuracy of judg-
ment as is required of her undc·r ordinary circum-
stances, and is not lia hlc• for injuries or damages 
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eauseu by her if an accident oeenrs, eYen though 
a course of action other than that which she pur-
sued might have been more judicious, provided 
she exercised ordinary care in the stress of the 
circumstances to avoid an accident.'' (R. 24-25) 
The above evidence being un_disputed, without con-
flict, in fact produced by plaintiff herself, it is manifest 
that the jury disregarded the evidence; and that the 
trial court in its rulings with reference thereto failed 
to apply the law which the court itself pronounced to 
be the law applicable to the facts of the case. 
There being no dispute on the facts, it \Yas a law 
question for the court and should have been so regarded. 
It was not a case of the jury believing or not believ-
ing evidence presented by defendant. The evidence was 
presented hy plaintiff as a part of plaintiff's case. 
That the above law is sound is amply sustained by 
the authorities. 
Section 41-6-144, U.C.A. 1933, proYides that every 
motor vehicle when operated on the highway shall be 
equipped with brakes adequate to control movement and 
stop the vehicle, including two separate means of ap-
plying the brakes, each of which shall be effective to 
apply the brakes to at least two wheels. This statute 
is substantially the same as similar statutes in other 
states. Courts generally, including this Court, have held 
that violation of these traffic laws is negligence per se 
unless such violation is excused by reason of a sudden 
emergency which reasonable prudence could not foresee, 
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such as unanticipated mechanical failure immediately 
prior to the accident. This is true as to all traffic viola-
tions, liability for which is not absolute, but rebuttable 
upon proper showing. Lights may be suddenly extin-
guished; steering gear or other equipment break; or a 
tire blow out ; or some other part of the mechanism fail. 
The opera tor of a -vehicle is not an insurer as to the 
condition of his car so long as he does not act negligently 
'vith reference thereto. \Y e respectfully submit that 
under the following authorities the trial court was in 
error in its rulings. 
This Court, in '"~1 orrison vs. Perry, 104 Utah 139, 
140 Pac. 2d 772, considered the violation of a traffic 
law, the result of explanation, and the fact that any 
presumption disappears where the evidence is uncon-
tradicted and stands alone. 
"Defendant in his brief says that it is true that 
when a collision occurs on the defendant's wrong 
side of the road a presumption of negligence 
arises in the absence of evidence explaining why 
his car was on the wrong side of the road. De-
fendant then vigorously argues that the moment 
an explanation is offered the presumption ceases 
and does not longer exist. This is true, but the 
evidence upon which the presumption was based 
remains in the case and is to he eonsidered h~r 
the jnr.v, unless there is no conflict between such 
evidence and the explanatory evidence. See State 
v. Green, 78 Utah 580, 6 P. 2(1 177; Buckley v. 
Francis, 78 Utah 606, 6 P. 2d 188; 9 Wigmore on 
EvidenrP (3rd Ed.) Sec. 2491.. Defendant cites 
Saltas v. Affleck, 99 Utah 65, 102 P. 2cl 493, 495. 
In that ca~0 the court said: 'rrhe evidence offered 
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in rebuttal of the presumption of the agency of 
the driver from proof of ownership may be so 
uncontradicted and conclusive as to entitle the 
court to say as a matter of law that the presump-
tion ha~ been rebutted.' Here "·e do not believe 
such evidence to be conclusive.'' 
In that case there was other evidence to be con-
sidered, but in this case there was not. The fact that 
under our rules the plaintiff is not bound by the evidence 
of an adverse party which he presents, does not have 
the effect of eliminating the evidence. It was the only 
evidence on the subject. 
lVhite c. Pinney, 99 Utah 484, 108 Pac. 2d 249. This 
was a case arising under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur; 
hence unlike the present case where no inference is in-
volved, but the question of mechanical failure was 
involved and it is pertinent ju that regard. Here is what 
this court said : 
''Defendants would not be liable for accident 
resulting from a defect in the mechanism of their 
truck and equipment of "Thich they had no knowl-
edge, and which would not be revealed by reason-
able and prudent inspection. \Y e quote from 3 
Huddy: Cyelopedia of .:\utomobile Law, 9th Ed., 
Section 71: 
'' 'G-enerall~T speaking, 1 t js the duty of one 
operating a motor vehicle on the public highways 
to see that it is in reasonably good condition and 
properly equipped, so that it may be at all times 
controlled, and not become a source of danger to 
its occupants or to other travelers. 
'' 'To this end, the owner or operator of a 
motor vehicle must exercise reasonable care in the 
8 
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inspection of the machine, and is chargeable with 
notice of everything that such inspection would 
disclose. This rule applies whether the operator 
is the owner of the vehicle or rents it from an-
other, or permits another to use it, or lets it to 
another for hire. But, in the absence of anything 
to show that the appliances were defective, the 
owner or driver is not required to inspect them 
before using the car or permitting it to be used.' 
"The great weight of authority holds that there 
is no liability on the part of the owner where an 
outsider has been injured by a defective mechan-
ism which was unknown to the owner and which 
would not have been disclosed by a reasonable 
inspection. * * * 
''The owner or operator of a motor vehicle 
must exercise reasonable care in the inspection 
of the machine, but in the absence of anything to 
show the appliances were defective the owner or 
driver is not required to inspect them each day 
before using or permitting them to be used. * * * 
If the operator or person in charge of such vehicle 
has done all that would be expected of an ordi-
narily prudent person, and a failure of his equip-
ment occurs, not reasonably foreseen, he is not 
guilty of negligence.'' 
~umerous authorities are cited and approved, In-
cluding Huddy, to sustain the law announced. 
This case was reaffirmed as to its applicable law 
in vVyatt rs. Baughman, ...... Utah ...... , 239 Pac. 2d 193. 
Ilanson vs. Weckerle (Cal.), 63 Pac. 2d 323. This 
was a case involving faulty brakes, becoming manifest 
just prior to the accident. The court said : 
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''However, we are of the opinion from the facts 
set out in the record that the brakes had held the 
backward movement of the automobile some 
twenty times previous to the accident, and like-
wise stopped the backward movement of the 
vehicle within 5 or 6 feet at the time of the acci-
dent, establishes beyond controversy the efficiency 
of the brakes. Notwithstanding the length of the 
arguments both for appellant and for the respon-
dents, there are just a few questions involved in 
this case, i.e., whether the appellant used due 
diligence in the stopping of the truck, or was 
negligent in :O.ot applying the brakes preceding the 
actual stopping of the engine and the commence-
ment of the backward movement. In other words, 
from the previous use of the brakes on the truck, 
in stopping the same, should the appellant have 
apprehended the immediate failure of the engine, 
and at the moment of stopping, had his brakes 
so applied as to prevent any backward move-
ments"? The testimony shows that Hanson was 
accustomed to block the truck when it stopped; 
that he was somewhere outside of the truck for 
that purpose at the time it stopped. Prior to the 
accident there had been no backward movement 
of the truck, and therefore he had a right to 
assume that when the truck stopped, it would 
stand stationary as on former occasions, and that 
the block might be immediately placed in posi-
tion.'' 
Trudeau, et al. vs. Sina Contracting Co. (~linn.), 62 
N.W. 2d 492. The court held that evidence of faulty 
brakes was prima facie evidence of negligence, but added 
that it was not conclusiYe evidence of liability, and hold-
ing that if defendant was confronted with a sudden 
emergenc~· through no fault of his own it was excusable 
10 
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and there was no liability. This was a brake case very 
similar in mauy respects to the case at bar. 
Sotlwron li. TV est, 180 ~I<l. 539; 26 Atl. 2d 16: 
''This is not the case of a latent defect which 
could not have been discovered. A person driving 
a ~t range car for the first time owes a duty to 
the public to see that there are no obvious defects 
in its mechanism which are apt to cause injury 
to others. DefectiYe brakes are obvious, because 
they can be detected by the simple pressure of a 
foot. The test is so simple that anyone can make 
it. If such a test shows the brakes in working 
order, and then they suddenly fail, the driver may 
not be liable for negligence in driving with them. 
If no test is made, if the brakes are not even tried, 
the driver cannot rely upon a presumption that 
the machine is safe. He will not then be excused 
from liaoility for the destruction he may cause 
upon the public highway because he did not know 
his brakes were bad.'' 
In the instant case a test was made on 8th South 
hill immediately prior to the accident and several times 
prior to the accident in driving the car in traffic, and 
they were found to be in good working order. It was a 
sudden mechanical failure without warning. 
The Supreme Court of California stated the general 
rule in 1'-.1af:terlee v. Orange Glenn School District, 177 
Pac. 2d 279. Violation of a statute is negligence per se 
or presumptive negligence but stated the following: 
''An act which is performed in violation of an 
ordinance or statute is presumptively an act of 
negligence, but the presumption is not conclusive 
11 
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and may be rebutted by showing that the act was 
justifiable or excusable under the circumstances. 
* * * 
''Thus in Rath v. Bankston, supra, where an 
automobile was parked partly on the highway in 
violation of the statute, the defendant was allowed 
to show that despite reasonably careful inspection 
the gasoline supply became exhausted, and the 
car stalled. In another case where a collision 
occurred with a car which had no taillight, evi-
dence that the light was inspected and found in 
good order a short time before was held admis-
sible to negative the presumption of negligence.'' 
5 Am. J ur. 642, Sec. 252, Automobiles : 
"On the other hand, the mere failure of brakes 
to function properly is not conclusive of the 
driver's negligence. It seems that where the 
brakes on an automobile have preYiously func-
tioned properly, but suddenly fail to respond, 
their failure does not render the owner guilty of 
negligence or contributory negligence, unless he 
had knowledge of the defective condition. Nor 
is driving· on a public highway an automobile "·ith 
defective brakes, contrary to the provisions of the 
statute, negligence per se which will render the 
driver absolutely liable for resulting injuries, re-
gardless of circumstances.'' 
60 C.J.S. 638, under "~Iotor Vehicles" has the fol-
lowing to say relating to brakes and violation of statutes 
relating thereto : 
"Violation as negligence. While there is au-
thority to the contrary, operation of a motor 
Yehicle ,,·ithout adequate brakes, in violation of a 
statute or ordinance, has been held to constitute 
negligence per se or prima facie evidence of an 
12 
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intent to violate the statute in this respect, ren-
dering the motorist liable for injuries proximately 
resulting from such defect. However, he will not 
be responsible where he is not chargeable with 
negligence in respect of the defect in the brakes, 
as where he was excusably ignorant of their de-
fective condition, and the mere fact that a motor 
vehicle had defective brakes does not show action-
able negligence imposing liability for injuries 
where such defect was not the proximate cause 
of the accident.'' 
Huddy Ency. of Automobile Law 3-4, Sec. 72, it is 
stated that failure to have a car equipped with proper 
brakes is negligence per se, but adds : 
"Where, however, there has been no lack of 
care on the part of the owner or operator, and 
the failure of the brakes is unexpected, or the 
result of an accident, no liability ensues." 
Brotherton z;s. Day & Night Fuel Co. (Wash.), 73 
Pac. 2d 788: 
"While it is true that violation of a statute is, 
generally speaking, negligence per se, it is also 
true that such violation is not negligence when 
due to some cause beyond the violator's control, 
and which reasonable prudence could not have 
guarded against.'' 
This doctrine was reaffirmed by the Washington 
Court in Jess vs. McNamen, 255 Pac. 2d 902. 
Bryant, et al. v. Tulare Ice Co. (Cal.), 270 Pac. 2d 
880: 
13 
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"While the general rule is that the violation 
of a statute is presumptive evidence of negligence 
it is also well established that in an emergency 
or under unusual conditions circumstances may 
be shown to excuse the violation.'' 
Howard v. Ringsby Truck Lines, 2 Utah 2d 65, 269 
Pac. 2d 295. This court considered and passed upon the 
degree of care required of a party in an emergency, 
approving the doctrine announced in Restatement of 
the Law of Torts, 769, and used the following language: 
"It must be borne in mind, however, that By-
ington was faced with a sudden and unexpected 
happening-and emergency-not caused by his 
own tortious conduct, and consequently he is re-
lieved of the same coolness of judgment which 
would be required of him in the absence of an 
emergency. * ~, "' Human reactions are not in-
stantaneous and the time required to react varies 
according to the nature of the danger and the 
surrounding circumstances. * * * During this 
brief interval, Byington had to react to the 
danger, determine a course of action and stop a 
truck traveling 45 miles per hour. We are in 
accord with the following apropos statement 
made by the court in Rollison v. Wabash R. Co., 
252 :Mo. 525, 160 S. W. 994, 999: 
'' '* * >~:, To predicate negligence on two seconds 
of time is in and of itself a monumental refine-
ment. We cannot adjudicate negligence on such 
pulse beats and hairsplitting, such airy nothings 
of surmise.' '' 
53 American J ur. 263, Sec. 326, under ''Trial'': 
''Upon proper motion the court may grant a 
non-suit where the evidence establishes facts 
14 
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constituting a complete defense to the action or 
the existence of such a defense is admitted.'' 
In this case the plaintiff herself presented the de-
fense and the facts constituting the defense. 
See also Stark's Estate (Cal.), 119 Pac. 2d 961. 
vV e respectfully submit that there was no issue of 
fact for submission to the jury; the evidence was un-
contradicted, not susceptible of different interpretation 
by different individuals, and it was a law question for 
the court. Plaintiff, by presenting the defense as well 
as her case, was in the same position as a party who 
sues on a note and then proves as a part of her case that 
there is no liabiltiy on the note. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICH, ELTON & :MANGUM 
ALVIN I. SMITH 
Attorneys for Appellants 
15 
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